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The corporate tender offer, here defined as the corporation's offer to
purchase its securities or those of another designated corporation from
all' who tender those securities to the corporation for sale, has become
increasingly popular in recent years2 for a variety of reasons. Some
corporations apparently feel that during periods of market decline the
low price of their shares makes purchases by the corporation de-
sirable.3 Even under normal circumstances, corporations which need
their own stock for such purposes as stock options or asset purchases
may find the tender offer the most satisfactory method of obtaining
their stock, 4 or one company may deem buying the shares of another
corporation to be the most desirable means of taking over the other com-
pany. There also may be other less legitimate explanations for the
corporation's purchase, as when it is done to secure management's
control of the corporation.
1 The New York Stock Exchange has requested that when a company is accepting only
a specified number of shares, tenders be accepted on a pro rata basis for at least ten days,
after which period acceptance may be on a "first come" basis. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE,
COMPANY MANUAL A-180 (1963). North Carolina has attempted to assure the equal treat-
ment of shareholders in each class by requiring pro rata purchases under some circum-
stances. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(c)(1) (1965).
2 See Fleck, Corporate Share Repurchasing: An Informal Discussion, Harv. Bus. S. Bull.,
Jan.-Feb. 1965, p. 10; Merjos, Embracing Tenders: Wall Street Is Growing Increasingly
Partial to Take-Over Bids, Barron's Nat'l Bus. & Financial Weekly, March 6, 1961, p. 5.
It has been estimated that in 1963 corporations spent 30% more purchasing their own
common stock than they raised through equity issues. Fleck, supra at 10.
3 See Holt & Morris, Some Aspects of Reacquired Stock, 1931-1933, 12 HARV. Bus. REv.
505 (1934); Vartan, Why Companies Buy Own Shares, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 18,
1963, p. 15, col. I; Bargains Gone Begging?, Forbes, Nov. 1, 1962, p. 34.
4 A corporation may have other reasons for acquiring its own shares, such as to eliminate
small holdings or to facilitate the sale of a large shareholder's stock. Fleck, supra note 2,
at 11; Zilber, Corporate Tender Offers for Their Own Stock: Some Legal and Financial
Considerations, 33 U. CINc. L. REv. 315, 317-19 (1964). However, it would seem that
alternative devices are available to the corporation in many situations in which the tender
offer is utilized. For instance, shares for stock options or asset purchases can easily be ob-
tained by issuing authorized but unissued shares or by authorizing additional shares. The
main advantage of the tender method is that it eliminates the need to obtain shareholder
approval of management's plans.
5 See STEvENS, CoRPoRATIoNs 279-80 (2d ed. 1949).
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To some extent state corporation and blue sky laws regulate tender
offers, 6 but recent cases indicate that federal securities law will provide
the most effective weapon for challenging them.7 The applicability
to tender offers of rule 1Ob-5,8 promulgated under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act,9 is part of the broader question whether the
scope of rule lOb-5 should be expanded to develop a "federal corpora-
tion law" regulating corporate mismanagement generally or should be
limited to cases of what is traditionally viewed as the purchase and sale
of securities.' 0
6 Statutes in every state authorize corporations to purchase their own stock and set forth
the limitations within which such purchases may be accomplished. See statutes listed in
1 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 5, 6 (1960, Supp. 1964). See generally Dodd, Purchase
and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own Shares, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 697 (1941); Kessler,
Share Repurchases Under Modern Corporation Laws, 28 FoRDAM L. Rv. 637 (1960). The
greatest barrier to effecting a corporate tender will often be found in the restrictions
imposed by the contract rights of bondholders and preferred shareholders.
7 Section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act, the model for an increasing number of
state blue sky laws, contains a provision identical to rule lOb-5, and most states which
have not adopted the uniform act have similar antifraud provisions. See Loss & CowETr,
BLUE SKY LAw 250-51 (1958). However, although a defrauded buyer may sue under the
uniform act, sellers' remedies are enforceable only by state administrators. UNIFORm SECU-
RITIEs AcT § 410. Such remedies afford sellers insufficient protection because administrators
do not have adequate funds to prosecute all suits. See 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1631
k2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
,circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
1 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1963): "Sec. 10. It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any national securities exchange ... (b) to use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
Additional provisions of the securities acts may be applicable in certain circumstances.
.Section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act would apply if the corporation sold its shares
on the exchange to lower the market price and the price which it would have to offer for
tenders. 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1963). In a suit by the corporation as a
purchaser, § 17 of the act, whose provisions are similar to those of rule lOb-5, might be
invoked. 48 Stat. 84 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1963). If the corporation were to
exchange stock which it held in other corporations for its own stock tendered to it, regis-
tration of the other corporation's stock might be required under the act and under state
blue sky laws. See 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1963); UNIFORM
SECURiTIES Acr § 301; Zilber, supra note 4, at 333-36; 1 Loss 182-84.
10 See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1146
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In general, two types of problems under rule lOb-5 may arise in con-
nection with a corporate tender offer. The first involves the injury to
the selling shareholder from the corporation's misrepresentation or
nondisclosure of a material fact upon which he relied in deciding to
sell. The second involves the insiders' use of the tender offer for per-
sonal profit or advantage. Such schemes may involve the tender of an
insider's shares at an excessive price or the use of the tender to secure
the insider's control of the corporation. This comment will explore the
application of the disclosure provisions of rule 1 Ob-5 to corporate tender
offers by focusing on the standard of disclosure which that rule would
appear to require in a tender offer and on the applicability of rule 1 Ob-5
when an insider breaches his fiduciary duty to the corporation in con-
nection with a tender offer."
I. THE APPLICABILITY OF RULE lOb-5 TO TENDER OFFERS FOR A
CORPORATION'S OWN SECURITIES
Past applications of rule lOb-5 to misrepresentations, omissions, and
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities leave no
doubt that tender transactions are within its scope;' 2 its provisions
regarding insider trading and nondisclosure apply to corporate tender
offers since the purchasing corporation possesses the ultimate in inside
information.' 3 Furthermore, there is no longer any doubt that liability
(1965); Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 171 (1964);
Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication
Through Rule lOb-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185 (1964); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule
10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963); Comment,
Civil Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doc-
trine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 680-82 (1965).
11 The discussion will deal primarily with the problems of publicly held corporations
although much of it is applicable to close corporations as well. For a general treatment of
purchases by close corporations, see 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE COR'ORATONS 1-80 (1958).
12 See Kohler v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (dictum); Northern Trust Co. v.
Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Ward La France Truck Corp.,
13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); 3 Loss 1453; Israels, Corporate Purchase of Its Own Shares-Are There
New Overtones?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 620 (1965); Kennedy, Transactions by a Corporation in
Its Own Shares, 19 Bus. LAw. 319 (1964). See generally S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING
STOCKHOLDRS AND IN UNDERWRITINGS 131-56 (Israels ed. 1962); Daum & Phillips, The
Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAW. 939 (1962); Comment, Insider Liability Under
Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CH. L. REv. 121
(1962).
13 In Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961), the SEC explained the basis of the
insider's liability: "Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and
second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing."
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under rule 1Ob-5 can arise in sales which are not made on a stock ex-
change,14 and that private parties may bring suit to enforce this liability
even though neither section 10(b) of the act nor rule 1Ob-5 mentions
private enforcement. 15 The reasoning of the Supreme Court in J. I.
Case Co. v. Borak,1 which held that there was an implied private
remedy under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act17 for a
violation of the proxy rules, applies as well to suits brought under rule
1Ob-518 and supports the argument that a tendering shareholder may
challenge misrepresentations or omissions of fact made in connection
with a corporation's offer to purchase.' 9
14 See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
870 (1961); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 814 (1961); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947); 3 Loss
1466-67.
Although the preamble to the Securities Exchange Act refers only to transactions "con-
ducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets," Securities Exchange Act
§ 2, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1963), judicial construction of § 10(b) has
emphasized the breadth of the section's language and the undesirability of exempting
the numerous transactions which are private from the provisions of the act. See cases cited
supra. It has been suggested that the § 10(b) mandate to prescribe rules and regulations
"in the public interest or for the protection of investors" indicates that Congress intended
the scope of § 10(b) to be broader than the preamble's language regarding exchanges
suggests. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., supra at 202; Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer
or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 505, 509-12 (1953). Some legislative history also suggests that Congress
intended the term "over-the-counter market" to include all transactions not occurring on
an exchange. See H.R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938). As construed, § 3(a)(10)
of the Securities Exchange Act defines "security" to include instruments which could hardly
be intended to be the subject of trading on exchanges or regular over-the-counter
markets: the Supreme Court has construed the term "investment contract" to include a
contract for the sale of citrus groves. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
15 See, e.g., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962);
Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., supra note 14; Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235
F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Fratt v. Robinson, supra note 14; Fischman v. Raytheon
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir. 1963) (dictum); Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962) (dictum); Comment,
supra note 12, 30 U. CH. L. REV. at 158-67; Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5: An
Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1133-35 (1950). See generally
Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REv. 361 (1932);
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1914); Note, New Civil
Liabilities Under Securities and Exchange Act Rules, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (1947).
16 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
17 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1963).
18 See Rogers v. Crown Stove Works, 236 F. Supp. 572, 573 (N.D. Ill. 1964), citing Borak
for the proposition that a private remedy exists under rule lob-5.
19 This comment is concerned mainly with actions brought by shareholders, even though
the analysis applies equally well to injunctions sought by the SEC. Most litigation will
probably arise from private suits since the SEC does not have the resources to scrutinize
every tender offer. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); Cary, Book Review,
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Both at common law2 0 and under rule lOb-521 the insiders' fiduciary
duty to shareholders has been extended to impose a duty on the
corporation which deals with its shareholders. The first application of
rule lOb-5 after its promulgation was to a corporation which purchased
its own shares without disclosing that it planned to resell the shares,
that it would probably be liquidated, or that the corporation's financial
position was vastly better than it had been in previous years.22 The
directors who authorized the tender offer owned a large percentage of
the company's outstanding shares. By having the corporation purchase
the stock at a price artificially low because important information was
not disclosed, they were able to obtain the same results as they would
have by purchasing the stock for themselves on the market-they
increased the percentage of total shares which they held and thus
garnered a greater portion of the corporation's assets upon liquidation
for less than that portion was worth-but without committing any of
their own funds. Although the Securities and Exchange Commission's
investigation resulted in a settlement between the corporation and its
shareholders, the Commission's report was calculated to inform the
business community that a corporation's use of inside information in
this way violates rule lOb-5. 23
Under rule 1 Ob-5 the fiduciary duty of disclosure to those from whom
the corporation purchases its stock may be breached by omissions to
disclose material facts as well as by affirmative misrepresentations. At
common law the majority rule probably did not require affirmative
disclosures,24 but it is generally agreed that rule 1Ob-5 encompasses
75 HARV. L. REv. 857, 861 (1962). In cases of special importance the SEC might undertake
the burden of litigation as it has in the recent action against the Texas Gulf Sulfur Cor-
poration. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Corp., Civil No. 65-1182, S.D.N.Y., April 19, 1965;
see Kennedy & Wander, Texas Gulf Sulfur, A Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. LAw. 1057
(1965). See also Comment, Recovery of Damages in Class Actions, 32 U. Cni. L. REv. 768,
784 (1965), suggesting that "the SEC could be given authority to act as a clearing house for
information concerning pending suits by stockholders anywhere in the United States."
20 See Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 Ill. App. 134, 108 N.E.2d 493
(1952); Wood v. McLean Drug Co., 266 Ill. App. 5 (1932); Steven v. Hale-Hass Corp., 249
Wis. 205, 231, 23 N.W.2d 620, 632 (1946) (dictum); 3 Loss 1454.
21 See authorities cited note 12 supra.
22 Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
23 Id. at 374. Immediately after Ward La France, the SEC initiated other investigations
involving the application of rule lob-5 to corporate stock purchases which also failed to
reach the litigation stage. SEC v. Boyd Transfer F, Storage Co., Civil No. 1548, D. Minn.,
Dec. 5, 1945 (consent decree), SEC Litigation Releases Nos. 295 (Aug. 20, 1945), 308 (Dec. 7,
1945); SEC v. Oils & Indus., Civil No. 27-450, S.D.N.Y., April 4, 1945 (dismissal on stipula-
tion), SEC Litigation Release No. 224 (Sept. 29, 1944).
24 See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6
H.L. 377 (1873). The minority view required affirmative disclosures. Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn.
170, 174, 188 N.W. 266, 268 (1922); Note, 14 MINN. L. REv. 530, 532 (1930). A compromise
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more than common law fraud.2 5 However, while rule 1Ob-5 does impose
a duty to disclose on the corporation which buys or sells stock to its
shareholders, this duty is not without certain limitations. One such
limitation is that liability exists only where the undisclosed fact is
"material"; another is that the nondisclosure must have actually caused
the plaintiff's injury.
A. Materiality
Although courts disagree as to which clause of rule 1Ob-5 is violated
by nondisclosure, 26 it is clear that a purchasing corporation has a duty
to disclose facts which "would materially affect the judgment of the
other party to the transaction. '27 Courts have not defined "materiality"
with much precision, and corporations offering to purchase have little
to guide them. The lack of a workable definition leaves the purchasing
corporation to decide at its peril what to disclose, knowing that a court
at some later date may determine that it was wrong.2 8 But at least some
position required disclosure in "special circumstances." Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419,
433-34 (1909). See generally Walker, The Duty of Disclosure by a Director Purchasing
Stock From His Stockholders, 32 YALE L.J. 637 (1923). It has been argued that present rule
lOb-5 doctrine is identical to the special circumstances rule. Ruder, Civil Liability Under
Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 629, 670-71 (1963).
But see Comment, supra note 12, 30 U.CH. L. REv. at 170.
25 E.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 814 (1961); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert.
denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D.
Pa. 1947); cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); McClure v.
Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
26 See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., supra note 25 (dictum) (violation of § 10b-5(c)); Speed
v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (violation of all three clauses); Joseph
v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), afJ'd, 198
F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (violation of § l0b-5(c)); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D.
Ohio 1959) (dictum), afJ'd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960) (§ lOb-5 to be read as a
whole); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (a violation at least of clause (c)); Com-
ment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. CH. L. REv. 824, 826-27 (1965).
Since the tender offer usually is accompanied by a short statement of the corporation's
financial condition, clause (b) will apply if additional facts are necessary to make these
statements accurate. Because additional facts may be required even if the stated facts are
not distorted, both clauses (a) and (c) may be pertinent.
27 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
28 The shareholder bringing suit will have the benefit of hindsight in viewing the trans-
action and utilizing discovery to examine documents which management may have con-
sidered unimportant at the time of the transaction. Courts should not permit plaintiffs to
recover when the materiality of undisclosed facts became apparent only after the tender
offer was -made, since to do so would place an unfair burden on corporations. See Kennedy
& Wander, supra note 19, at 1067. Rather, courts should be concerned with determining
whether the corporation failed to disclose facts which a reasonable man would have
deemed material at the time of the transaction. Reliance on hindsight was properly rejected
by one court which limited evidence to facts actually known by the directors at the time of
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guidelines may be found. As a bare minimum, the corporation should
fully disclose its current earnings and the approximate market value
per share of its assets. Also, unusual information which has a material
bearing on the security's value, such as the anticipated sale of assets,
should be disclosed.2 9
In Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,30 the district court concluded that
the failure to disclose the true value of inventory and management's
intent to dispose of that inventory amounted to a fraudulent scheme
violating all three clauses of rule lOb-5. Most nondisclosures will not
involve facts so obviously material to the shareholder's decision to sell
as those in Speed; facts concerning the usual course of business will
often be "material" for rule lOb-5 purposes. Since at least in theory
the corporation "knows" all facts relating to its affairs, this burden of
disclosure may be difficult to meet. Hence, it might be argued that
some limitation on what facts are material must be devised so the cor-
poration's burden of disclosure will be tolerable. 31
the transaction. Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91523 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
The only cases in which the plaintiff has been required to prove that the directors were
aware of the facts which they failed to disclose, however, have been those brought by
purchasers, and the courts in those cases have been forced to reconcile liability under rule
10b-5 with that under § 12(2) of the Securities Act. Section 12(2) requires no proof of
scienter and sets up a lack of knowledge as an affirmative defense. Some courts have im-
ported a scienter requirement into purchasers' suits under rule lOb-5 to distinguish them
from § 12(2) suits. See, e.g., Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Trus-
sell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964). But see, e.g., Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). In most suits brought by sellers, however, the issue has
been ignored. E.g., Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (ND.
I1. 1952); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). At most it
would appear that negligence must be established. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634,
637 (7th Cir. 1963) (rejecting any requirement of knowledge or bad faith); Note, Proof o
Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule lOb-5, 63 MICH. L. Ray.
1070 (1965); Comment, supra note 26, 32 U. Cui. L. REv. 824; Comment, supra note
10, 74 YALE L.J. 658.
29 One suggestion for determining what is a material fact for purposes of a registration
statement and prospectus under § 5 of the 1933 Securities Act is that all facts necessary to
enable a calculation of value by a capitalization of future earnings should be disclosed.
The "elements of risk" become the crucial facts, including the position of the corporation
in its industry. Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16
Bus. LAw. 300, 320 (1961). A similar approach might be feasible to determine what is
material to a decision to sell.
30 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
31 Some commentators have predicted that various dire consequences would result from
an expansion of disclosure requirements. See Kennedy & Wander, supra note 19, at 1067;
Ruder, supra note 10, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. at 208-14; Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securi-
ties Markets, 19 Bus. LAw. 721 (1964); Comment, supra note 10, 74 YALE L.J. at 689-90.
The burden of disclosure may be no greater under rule lOb-5 than the burden when the
corporation offers its securities for sale. The prospectus and registration statement are re-
quired to include what are essentially all material facts. 68 Stat. 685 (1954), 15 U.S.C.
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The limitation should not, however, permit a corporation to refrain
from disclosing information merely because it is available to the share-
holder if he cares to examine the corporation's documents. 32 Requiring
a stockholder with no special expertise to search vast quantities of docu-
ments would permit the purchasing corporation effectively to evade
its duty to disclose. Imposing this burden on the shareholder would
be especially onerous if his security is not traded publicly since there
would be no indication of its value other than that which a diligent
search of all the corporation's records would suggest. Unusual cir-
cumstances, such as a proposed sale of assets, could intentionally be
recorded in some obscure corporate document. A more reasonable ap-
proach might be to allow the corporation to rely on the disclosure of
information in its reports to the SEC. These documents are open to
public inspection and contain much of the normal business data neces-
sary to evaluate securities.33 However, because many shareholders may
not know that such information is available or may not be in a position
to seek it out, the corporation should be required to disclose separately
at least such "special information" as plans for the future.3 4 In fact be-
§ 77j (1964); 48 Stat. 88 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1964). The proxy rules also require infor-
mation disclosing material facts. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1964). Thus, the information which
must be disclosed by the corporation issuing a tender offer may have already been compiled
to meet the prospectus and registration or proxy requirements, in which case the only
burden on the corporation at the time of the tender offer would be the expense of dis-
tributing the information to its stockholders.
32 But see Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963), awarding judgment for
the corporation and relying partly on the fact that the seller, a former director, could have
insisted that the corporation furnish him with the documents necessary to ascertain the
value of his shares.
33 The 1964 amendments to the Securities Acts require that periodic reports be filed
even by companies not listed on an exchange if they have total assets of one million dollars
or more and have 750 holders of record of equity securities. After July 1, 1966, corporations
with 500 shareholders also must file reports unless exempted by the SEC. SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4725, Sept. 15, 1964.
New York Stock Exchange Rule 13(a)(13), form 9(k) requires semiannual reports of gross
sales, operating revenues, net income, charges and credits to earned surplus, and extraordi-
nary and special transactions. Rule 13(a)(11), form 8(k) requires that extraordinary acquisi-
tions and dispositions of assets and specified changes in capital and control structure be
reported within ten days after the close of a calendar month in which the actions take
place. The New York Exchange also requires immediate reporting of dividend changes,
redemptions, business purchases, and changes in officers and directors. NEw YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL, A-91-93 (1956), 94-104 (1959).
34 Some writers have argued that the SEC disclosure requirements discourage the misuse
of insider information so much that any further requirement of disclosure by rule lOb-5 is
unnecessary. FEUER, PERSONAL LIABILITY OF CoRPoRATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 175 (1961).
But the reporting requirement is an insufficient stimulus to full disclosure because an
inadvertent deficiency in reports to the SEC does not occasion liability. In addition, the
reports do not contain all material information. One court has pointed out that normally
the information which the corporation does not want disclosed will not be found in the
Corporate Tender Offers
cause these "special facts" will usually be more important to the share-
holder than information about the corporation's ordinary business,
the most crucial problem regarding materiality concerns these unusual
occurrences.
The recent case of List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,3 5 involving a director's
purchase of shares from a stockholder, raises by analogy the question of
what plans for future actions must be disclosed by the purchasing
corporation as material facts. In List the Second Circuit affirmed a
finding that the directors' adoption of a resolution to sell the cor-
poration was not a material fact, stating that disclosure would not
have discouraged the shareholder from selling his shares since no profit
was assured on the proposed sale of the corporation and in any case the
possibility of sale was too remote to have influenced the conduct of a
reasonable investor.36
The court's reasoning in List may be ingenuous. There is no ques-
tion that information of a speculative nature, such as forecasts of
market price, need not be divulged and may even provide a basis for
a claim of misrepresentation if disclosed.37 But information which is
so speculative that the reasonable investor will either find no value in
it or will place undue emphasis on it38 must be distinguished from facts
which, when disclosed with adequate explanation, would probably
influence substantially a rational investor's decision to tender. Negotia-
tions to sell a corporation which reach the stage where a directors'
company's books and records. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962),
aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). See Comment, supra note 15, 59 YALE L.J. at 1149.
35 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
36 The court based its decision in part on James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v.
Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 264 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959), which
held that only an "assured sale" could be a material fact, the "possibility of sale" being too
remote to be material. The court in List ignored Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C.
373, 379 (1943), where the SEC concluded that the "considerable probability" that the cor-
poration would be liquidated was sufficient to require disclosure. As an indication of the
immateriality of the plan to sell, the List court also relied upon the defendant's selling 75%
of his shares at a one dollar profit rather than holding for a larger profit when the corpora-
tion was subsequently sold. This fact, however, hardly supports a finding of immateriality
as of the time the insider purchased the stock. The opinion is criticized in 37 COLO. L. REv.
508 (1965).
37 It has been held that predictions of a market price increase will violate rule lOb-5
if there is no "reasonable basis in fact" for such predictions. SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co.,
CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 91554 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 1965). In Cady, Roberts, the SEC implied
that information which was "a result of perceptive analysis of generally known facts" would
be exempt from the disclosure requirement. 40 S.E.C. 907, 915 (1961).
38 Some common law cases suggest that an insider may have a fiduciary duty not to dis-
dose his opinions where they will be given unduly authoritative weight by the shareholder.
Tone v. Halsey, Stuart 8. Co., 286 Ill. App. 169, 3 N.E.2d 142 (1936); Sluss v. Brown-Crummer
Inv. Co., 143 Kan. 14, 53 P.2d 900 (1936).
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resolution authorizes the sale are no longer too remote to be considered
by shareholders contemplating tendering their shares even if a buyer
for the corporation has not yet been found.
Although the decision in List may be difficult to justify, the notion
of remoteness is useful. Intent\is unquestionably a fact which must be
disclosed by a purchaser. 39 In Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,4 the court
held that the intention to sell or liquidate the corporation in the future
and to realize the gain from appreciated inventory was a material fact
which should have been disclosed to the selling shareholder. It has
even been held that one who, after the sale, violates an implied
representation made at the time of the transaction is liable for failing
to disclose his intention not to honor the implied representation. 41
The critical distinction is between a firm intent to act in the future and
mere discussion by management which has not resulted in a decision;
the former is material and must be disclosed, the latter is not and need
not be revealed. 42 The remoteness of the action already taken in
relation to the procedure needed for completing the transaction will
determine whether the action is material. In a public corporation,
the corporation's failure formally to record its decision might indicate
that a final intention to act had not been formed. This lack of formality
is less important in close corporations, and in any case would not be
decisive where it could be shown that the corporation had decided to
act but was attempting to conceal its decision.
The requirement to disclose all facts which would affect the share-
holder's decision to sell poses another serious problem. Making public
certain confidential information such as delicate merger negotiations or
the development of a new and untested product might harm the
39 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (no intent at the time of the sale to keep
a promise to share control); Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (dictum) (breach of promise made at the time of sale); see 3 Loss 1469.
40 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
41 United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91288 (Md. Cir. Ct.
1963); see Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965). But
see Lester v. Preco Indus., Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91562 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1965) (re-
fusing to consider the "evil intent" to injure in the future a fact which was not disclosed at
the time of the transaction). Ruder, supra note 10, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. at 205-06, criticizes the
extension of rule lOb-5 liability in such situations.
42 The NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL, A-19, 20 (1965), 21 (1962), sets
forth the reasons for not disclosing certain plans for the corporation's future until a final
decision has been made. Thereafter, timely disclosure is required, and the Exchange has
requested corporate officials to disclose certain decisions, such as plans for mergers, stock
splits, new contracts, products or discoveries, acquisitions, and changes in dividend rates
or earnings. On the other hand, because management may countermand its decisions at
the last -minute, it has been suggested that it might be best not to require that such plans
be disclosed. Daum & Phillips, supra note 12, at 956-57.
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corporation.4 3 Yet the SEC in Cady, Roberts & Co. stated bluntly that if
material facts could not be revealed, the insider had no business in
the market. 4 This confronts the corporation with the difficult task of
weighing the advantages of the purchase against the harm from the
release of confidential information.4 5
It has also been said that materiality is defined in terms of the knowl-
edge and "actual . . .business acumen" of the particular shareholder
who sues.46 Such a consideration might be relevant in the case of a
close corporation with only a few dozen shareholders, but it is not
helpful where a publicly held corporation is involved. A corporation
would be required to employ primitive financial language to ensure that
every shareholder could comprehend the data it was trying to commu-
nicate. Instead, the standard should be an objective one whereby mate-
rial facts are those which "in reasonable and objective contemplation
might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities and
which the insiders should reasonably believe are unknown to the out-
sider."47 This standard would allow the corporation to send each share-
43 It would probably never be necessary to disclose the contents or formula of a trade
secret, as the shareholder is satisfied with knowing merely that the company possesses a
secret essential to a particular process.
44 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); see Cary, Recent Developments in Securities Regulation, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 856, 864 (1963). In Van Alstyne, Noel 8, Co., 33 S.E.C. 311 (1952), the Com-
mission held that a broker-dealer who made misleading statements and failed to reveal
material facts in selling a company's securities violated antifraud provisions notwithstanding
his assertion that the information he concealed had been obtained from the company in
confidence and could not be revealed. Id. at 320-21.
It might be thought that conflicting duties are placed on the director in that he has an
obligation to the corporation to purchase the shares at the lowest possible price, while
rule lOb-5 may make it necessary for him to disclose facts which will make it more costly
for the corporation to purchase its shares than if that information were not disclosed. See
Note, SEC Action Against Fraudulent Purchasers of Securities, 59 HARv. L. REv. 769, 777-
78 (1946). There is some indication that the director has a duty to purchase at as low a
price as possible without committing common law fraud. See Bisbee v. Midland Linseed
Prods. Co., 19 F.2d 24, 28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 564 (1927); Note, Fiduciary Duty
of Officers and Directors Not To Compete with the Corporation, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1191, 1196
(1941). No court, however, could hold a director to a duty which would require him to
violate rule lob-5 since federal law overrides conflicting provisions of local law. U.S. CONST.
art. VI; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 210 (1824); see Comment, supra note 12,
30 U. CHI. L. REv. at 155-58.
45 The dilemma which might face a corporation is illustrated in the pending SEC
action against Texas Gulf Sulfur Corporation. The discovery of a high grade copper and
zinc deposit was concealed from the public while insiders bought the corporation's stock on
the market. If the corporation had disclosed its discovery at an earlier time, it would have
been much more difficult, if not impossible, to purchase the land and mineral rights in the
vicinity of the original discovery. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Corp., Civil No. 65-1182,
S.D.N.Y., April 19, 1965. See Kennedy & Wander, supra note 19.
46 See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1963).
47 Id. at 642; cf. Shvetz v. Industrial Rayon Corp., 212 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
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holder the same information at the time of the tender offer and would
impose a practical limit on the quantity of information which need be
disclosed.
B. Reliance
Materiality should not be confused with reliance, another limitation
on the insiders' duty of disclosure under rule IOb-5. 48 In List v. Fashion
Park, Inc.,49 the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit because
the buyer's failure to disclose that he was an insider was not relied
upon by the plaintiff in deciding to sell. Although the Second Circuit's
choice of the term "reliance" in this context is somewhat misleading,
since a more accurate statement of the concept would be that liability
should not be imposed if the corporation's failure to disclose did not
cause the plaintiff's injury, other courts have utilized the term in finding
that the insider may be exculpated if disclosure of the true facts would
not have convinced the plaintiff to refrain from selling.50 This applica-
holding that a corporation need not explain the ramifications of a proxy solicitation in
elementary terms understandable to every layman. Rule 405, promulgated under the regis-
tration provisions of the Securities Act, defines "material" to include "those matters as to
which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the
security registered." 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1964).
In discussing the common law action of fraud in sales, § 538(2)(a), RESrATEMENT, ToRTs
(1934), defines "materiality" in terms of whether "a reasonable man would attach impor-
tance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question." Accord, 1 'HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 565-66 (1956); PROssER, TORTS 554-55 (2d ed.
1955). This definition was accepted by the court in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457
(2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). The court indicated that
this test was to be distinguished from the test of reliance which is unique to each plaintiff.
Id. at 463.
It should be noted that the court in Kohler utilized the selling shareholder's "actual ...
business acumen" to absolve the corporation from any obligation to disclose data in terms
that the most ignorant investor could understand. The plaintiff in Kohler was a former
director with formidable financial experience. In these terms, the Kohler approach makes
sense: the corporation must disclose only that which the ordinary investor would find
necessary to an informed judgment; yet if it fails to do so, a specially expert plaintiff will
still be foreclosed from suing because he did not reasonably rely on the corporation's failure
to disclose. But this is really a statement of the reliance factor which is a limitation on the
corporation's liability for nondisclosure in addition to and distinct from materiality.
48 E.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., supra note 47, at 462-64. By analogy to § 12(2) of the
Securities Act, it might be argued that proof of injury is an additional limitation on share-
holder suits. In Mott v. Tri-Continental Financial Corp., 330 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1964), the
plaintiff resold the securities for the same price he paid and was not permitted under
§ 12(2) of the Securities Act to sue for either damages or rescission.
49 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
5o Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 1959); Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d
79, 88 (2d Cir. 1956); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944); Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611, 615 (D. Mass. 1955); Mills v. Sarjem Corp.,
133 F. Supp. 753, 767 (D.N.J. 1955); see Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for
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tion of the rule 1Ob-5 reliance principle is proper since in cases of mis-
representation a statement which is not relied upon is not a basis for
compensation because it does not cause the plaintiff's injury.51 This re-
quirement necessitates an examination of the state of mind of each
plaintiff in the light of his own financial expertise and knowledge of the
corporation's affairs as well as of the information disclosed to him by the
corporation.52 The shareholder's financial sophistication would then
tend to vitiate the corporation's liability to him; but the extraordinary
ignorance of a particular shareholder would not expand the corpora-
tion's liability because such liability exists only for material omissions,
those which the reasonable investor would have found useful. '
C. Director's Actual Knowledge
This discussion has presupposed that all material facts are known
to at least some of the insiders who are responsible for the tender offer.
The corporation purchasing stock could then be held liable for the
knowledge of its agents. However, the limits placed on the information
which the corporation is obliged to divulge should take into account
the fact that the officers and directors of a large corporation cannot be
acquainted with all of the company's affairs. To do so would not un-
duly limit the scope of rule lOb-5 since its purpose is to prevent the
utilization of inside information to the detriment of the uninformed. 54
"Where unawareness of the undisclosed facts on the part of those au-
thorizing the tender offer is reasonable, the corporation should not be
liable under rule lOb-5 because this is one of the risks of investing
the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule lOb-5, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 1361,
1366-72 (1965).
51 See Mott v. Tri-Continental Financial Corp., 330 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1964).
52 Once the shareholder has established the materiality of the fact omitted or misrep-
resented, it might be best to give him the benefit of a presumption that he in fact relied
upon the misrepresentation or that the omission caused his injury. This presumption would
be justified by the difficulty of proving reliance and the probability that shareholders will
rely upon representations made by the corporation. In Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965), the court of appeals applied such a presumption
and rejected the defendant's claim that the district court had not found that the plaintiff
relied upon the misrepresentation. The court, referring to the relationship of trust between
the shareholder and defendant insider, held that a finding of reliance was implicit in the
lower court's decision. Even if other courts do not adopt this approach, the burden of
going forward will probably shift to the defendant once the plaintiff testifies that he relied
upon the misrepresentation, requiring the defendant to furnish proof of nonreliance if the
plaintiff's testimony is believed.
53 In a suit by more than one shareholder, the distinction between materiality and
reliance would be important. Even if the undisclosed facts were proved to be material, one
plaintiff might recover and the other not if the nondisclosure caused the first to sell but
was irrelevant to the decision of the second.
54 See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951); Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
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which the shareholder must bear. This standard should amply protect
the shareholder if the insider has the burden of proving both that he
was actually unaware of a fact so important that it materially affects
the security's value and that this unawareness was reasonable. 5  V
If one of the insiders for his personal gain should deliberately con-
ceal the existence of a material fact from the rest of those authorizing
the tender offer, the corporation should probably still be liable for
the nondisclosure. The other directors should reasonably be expected
to know most information which one insider might learn and which
would be material to shareholders. In any case the corporation should
bear the risk since it is in a better position to detect the fraud and
should be responsible for the knowledge of its directors on something
akin to principles of agency.50 Where the remedy granted for a viola-
tion of rule 1Ob-5 is rescission of the transaction the corporation may
be in no worse position than before the transaction.57 The company
should also be permitted to recover against the deceiving director.58
55 Several cases dealing with the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act seem to apply
a "due diligence" standard and imply that the insider must make reasonable efforts to
ascertain important facts. Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1940); Alexander
Reid & Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 6727 (Feb. 8, 1962); see 3 Loss 1440; Comment,
supra note 15, 59 YALE L.J. at 1148. State corporation law imposes a similar duty upon
directors to inform themselves about the business affairs of the corporation, at least to the
extent that they be able to vote intelligently at board meetings. See, e.g., Bates v. Dresser,
251 U.S. 524 (1920); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 Fed, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); BALLANTINE, CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 62, 63 (rev. ed. 1946); Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. RFv. 1305
(1934). It is arguable that the ignorance of a director who is not informed to the extent
required by his duty is not reasonable. In any case, the duty imposed by state law probably
does not encompass all facts which would be material if undisclosed to a selling share-
holder under rule lob-5.
56 If the directors can be considered agents of the corporation for purposes of tender
offers, the corporation might be held for their torts when they act within the scope of
their authority and "ostensible authority." E.g., Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen 9- Co.,
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91565 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (indicating that the corporation may be a "con-
trolling person" responsible for its agents' violations of the securities acts).
57 Loss suggests that the plaintiff may elect rescission or damages. 3 Loss 1792-94. The
exact measure of damages in a suit under rule lOb-5 is not clear since few reported cases
discuss this issue. Recently in Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 879 (1965), the court held the purchaser who failed to disclose a material fact liable not
only for the difference between the value of the securities at the time of the sale and the
amount paid by the plaintiff, but also for the amount by which the value increased after
the transaction. Thus, the plaintiff received not only the amount he lost at the time of the
sale, but also the amount which he would have received had he kept the stock. An account-
ing for profits appears to be the general rule. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp.
798 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947); 3 Loss 1793-94. Although rescission
would ordinarily not harm the corporation, it might be difficult for the corporation to re-
turn the stock if it had been used for a merger, acquisition of assets, or similar transaction,
except by authorizing and issuing new shares.
58 Under § 410(b), UNIFORM SEcuRrrsES AcT, enacted in twenty states, all directors are
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II. THE APPLICABILITY OF RULE lOb-5 TO TENDER OFFERS FOR
SECURITIES OF ANOTHER CORPORATION
The increasing popularity of the tender offer as a device by which one
corporation seeks to acquire control of another by offering to buy all of
its shares which are tendered for sale at a stipulated price59 raises the
problem of whether the limits of the rule 1Ob-5 duty to disclose in such
"take-over bid" situations are identical to those imposed when a corpo-
ration offers to purchase its own stock. It is not clear that a duty to dis-
close exists at all, even though rule 1Ob-5 literally applies to "any per-
son." Both at common law 0 and under rule lOb-501 a fiduciary duty to a
shareholder has been required before a duty to disclose will be found. If
the purchasing corporation is already a controlling shareholder in the
second corporation, a fiduciary duty exists since a controlling share-
holder is considered an insider in his relations with minority sharehold-
ers.02 The existence of a similar duty is more difficult to establish
where the purchasing corporation has only a small interest or none at
all in the second corporation at the time it makes the tender offer.
There is reason to believe that the purchasing corporation has no
duty of disclosure63 except when it obtains material facts from an in-
liable for the corporation's misrepresentation unless they can affirmatively prove their lack
of knowledge concerning the -misrepresentation. At common law a director, who is deemed
to be a trustee for the corporation whose assets constitute the trust corpus, might be held
liable if he allowed other directors to profit at the corporation's expense. Cf. Mosser v.
Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951).
Under the Securities Exchange Act all "controlling persons" are jointly liable unless they
establish that they acted in good faith and did not induce the act constituting the violation.
48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1964). It appears that "control" requires more than
merely serving on the board of directors and liability will probably be attributed only when
the defendant should have known of the violation and could have prevented it. See 3 Loss
1808-11; cf. Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark.
1949).
59 See Merjos, Embracing Tenders: Wall Street Is Growing Increasingly Partial to Take-
Over Bids, Barron's Nat'l Bus. & Financial Weekly, March 6, 1961, p. 5; Cash Is Eclipsing
Proxy Wars, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1966, p. 110, col. 3. This device is more properly called
a take-over bid than a tender offer.
G0 E.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909); Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581
(N.Y. 1868).
61 E.g., Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d
685 (6th Cir. 1960); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955); see Painter,
supra note 50, at 1383-84.
62 James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 264 F.2d 445 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del.
1951). Few cases at common law considered the fiduciary status of controlling shareholders.
3 Loss 1446 n.4; see Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5:
The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 121, 131 n.51 (1962). The shareholder who
is able to control without majority ownership should be considered an insider since insider
liability is based on the ability to command inside information.
63 Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiatn, 279 F.2d 685
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sider in the second corporation. Cady, Roberts &v Co. suggests that the
recipient of information from an insider, although not an insider him-
self, is equally obligated to disclose.64 Agency theories, analogous to the
"relationship" with an insider found in Cady, Roberts, have been in-
voked at common law to impose liability on the purchaser who gains
information from an insider.65 In large part, however, these authorities
hold the purchaser responsible to the corporation, the beneficiary of
the constructive trust imposed on the purchaser who acts with inside
information. 66
Information which is obtained in the course of business relations
and which is not publicly known may transform the recipient into an
insider.67 Thus, when insiders of the second corporation share inside
information with those who seek to purchase their corporation, the
purchasers should also be considered insiders. The only reason for
limiting Cady, Roberts is to protect from liability those who receive
(6th Cir. 1960); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955); see 3 Loss 1434. The
court in Mills held that even if the corporation obtained over 50% of the stock it would
not be forced to disclose information gained while it was still an outsider. This position is
untenable unless the policy behind rule lob-5 extends only to those who are in a fiduciary
relationship when the information is received, and Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961), casts considerable doubt on such an assumption.
64 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). The SEC noted that rule lOb-5 literally applies to "any person"
and "thus our task here is to identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a
company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading
in its securities." Id. at 912. The Commission relied on § 201(2), RESTATEMENT, R ESTrru-
TION (1937): "Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates
confidential information to a third person, the third person, if he had notice of the viola-
tion of duty, holds upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes
through the use of such information." In the private litigation resulting from the recent
SEC action against Texas Gulf Sulfur Corporation, supra note 45, the courts will be
required to determine how far the "relationship" discussed in Cady, Roberts extends, since
many purchasers of shares were not insiders but had received tips to buy without realizing
the confidential nature of the information. See Kennedy & Wander, Texas Gulf Sulfur, A
Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. LAw. 1057 (1965).
65 In re Frazin & Oppenheim, 181 Fed. 307, 311 (2d Cir. 1910); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§§ 85, 272 (1933); 3 Loss 1450; Comment, supra note 62, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. at 145-47; cf.
Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 410 (1962).
66 See Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949), holding an em-
ployee who purchased his employer corporation's stock on the open market on the basis of
secret information obtained at work liable to the corporation for his profits even though no
loss to the corporation was shown. In some cases the insider-fiduciary may be liable for
profits made by third persons with whom he shares no financial interest. See Mosser v.
Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951).
67 Hughes & Treat, 22 S.E.C. 623 (1946); Note, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 429, 434 (1951); Com-
ment, The Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59
YALE L.J. 1120, 1134 (1950). A broker inducing a corporate employee to transmit informa-
tion to him was held liable to a purchaser under rule lOb-5, although his liability may be
explained by the special duties of a broker. Herbert L. Honohan, 13 S.E.C. 754 (1943).
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information without being aware of its confidential nature.6 It is im-
probable that a purchasing corporation with inside information will be
an "innocent party" deserving protection; more likely, it will have de-
liberately attempted to learn as much as possible about the company
before issuing the tender offer. Even if the purchasing corporation does
not encourage the insider to reveal the information, it may be aware
that disclosures to it involved a breach of trust.6 9
Although the corporation purchasing its own shares is properly
deemed to know all material facts about its own operations, the like-
lihood that it will have the same knowledge when purchasing stock
of another corporation is not nearly so great. Therefore, it should be
presumed that the purchasing corporation had no knowledge of any in-
side information concerning the second company. Such a presumption
of arm's-length dealing would, however, be destroyed if nondisclosure or
misrepresentation of a material fact and some degree of inside knowl-
edge of the purchased corporation are shown, with the burden shifting
to the purchaser to prove that it did not know the fact.
An important difference between the facts which must be disclosed
by the corporation purchasing its own stock and the corporation seek-
ing to take over another company by purchasing its stock is that the
former must disclose its firm plans for future actions-these constitute
inside information-while the latter need not, since its plans are not
the plans of insiders until it becomes the controlling shareholder. 70
68 See 3 Loss 1451; Painter, supra note 50, at 1389; Note, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 429, 438-39
(1951). Each commentator advocates following § 201(2), RsTATEMENT, RsrrruT1oN (1937),
quoted supra note 64, by requiring disclosure by those who receive insiders' "tips" and
know that they constitute a breach of trust. The common law cases applying this rule of
disclosure to outsiders involved a relationship between the insider and outsider which went
beyond the mere transmission of information. The outsider either induced the insider to
procure the information, obtained the information as a result of an employment relation-
ship, or traded with the tacit consent of the insider who knew of the transaction and was
in a position to control it. See Comment, supra note 62, 80 U. CHi. L. REv. at 125-80. This
may explain the statement in Cady, Roberts respecting the "existence of a relationship"
there. The insistence on proof of some sort of bilateral relationship would guard against
entrapping the innocent investor. See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial
Revision of Legislative Intent, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627, 669-70 (1968). Ruder has suggested
elsewhere that the trend of the cases indicates that all persons possessing inside information,
no matter how obtained, may now have a duty of disclosure. Ruder, Pitfalls in the Devel-
opment of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw.
U.L. Ruv. 185, 194 (1964).
69 In neither Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam,
279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960), nor Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 138 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955), where
the courts held that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant, did the
insider give confidential information to the defendant. Hence, these cases are not incon-
sistent with requiring a purchasing corporation to disclose information obtained from
insiders of the second corporation.
70 Cf. Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
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III. APPLICATION OF RULE lOb-5 TO INSIDERS' SELF-DEALING
When directors or other insiders manipulate the tender offer to
their advantage, they violate their fiduciary duty to the corporation.
This constitutes a cause of action under state law.71 Rule 1Ob-5 may
also be a basis for relief against such self-dealing insiders.
The most frequent scheme whereby the insider employs deception
in the tender offer to benefit himself at the expense of the corporation
is to set the tender offer price much higher than the fair value and
to tender his own stock. He will probably be willing to allow the others
who tender to share in the looting of the corporate treasury. If he can
sufficiently confuse or deceive the remaining shareholders into think-
ing that the price is not exorbitant, the insider can reap a large gain.
He might even cause the corporation to bid up the market price for its
securities by purchases before making the tender offer, thus causing
the tender price to appear more equitable.7 2
Judge Augustus Hand pointed out that a breach of fiduciary duty
does not necessarily involve liability under rule 1Ob-5. In Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp.,73 recovery was denied in a derivative suit which
alleged that the sale of the insider-defendant's controlling shares in the
corporation to a third person constituted fraud upon the corporation.
The Second Circuit held that rule 1Ob-5 did not apply because it was
directed only at the type of fraudulent practice or misrepresentation
"usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than
at fraudulent mismanagement." 74 This is not to say, however, that
fraudulent mismanagement or acts in breach of a fiduciary duty cannot
constitute a violation of rule lOb-5; it is just that such mismanagement
must be "usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities. 70
A. An Insider's Deception in Tendering His Stock
It can be argued that rule lOb-5 is not applicable to an insider's
sale of stock to the corporation at an excessive price because the sale
71 See, e.g., Dixmoor Golf Club v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 156 N.E. 785 (1927); Ross Transp.
v. Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946); REsTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 390 (1958);
Rohrlich & Rohrlich, Psychological Foundations for the Fiduciary Concept in Corporation
Law, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 432 (1938); Uhlman, The Legal Status of Corporate Directors, 19
B.U.L. RFv. 12 (1939).
72 The income tax aspects of corporate distributions are of great importance to the
insider who attempts to appropriate a large part of the corporation's surplus by tendering
his shares. For a discussion of these problems, see Zilber, Corporate Tender Offers for
Their Own Stock: Some Legal and Financial Considerations, 33 U. C5NC. L. REv. 315, 356-
66 (1964).
73 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
74 Id. at 464.
75 Acts which violate state corporation laws may also involve liability under rule lOb-5.
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constitutes no more than a breach of a fiduciary duty and mismanage-
ment of the internal affairs of the corporation.70 The Securities Ex-
change Act demonstrates concern "for the protection of investors"
trading with those possessing inside knowledge respecting the value of
securities, 77 and arguably the corporation purchasing its own securities
does not fall within the protection of the act because it is not an "in-
vestor." However, this view has been rejected because courts have
broadly construed the securities acts to effectuate their purpose of
protecting investors. 7 This approach would appear justified in the
case of a tender offer since an investor, the nontendering shareholder,
is injured by the loss which the corporation suffers when it purchases
its stock at an inflated price. 79
Relief under the Securities Exchange Act is "in addition to any and all other rights." 48
Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1964).
76 See Comment, Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule 10B-5: A Suggestion for
Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 681-82 (1965).
77 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to promulgate neces-
sary rule3 "in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
78 In Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961), the court noted that § 10(b) also included those offenses which must be
prevented "in the public interest," and the court considered the deception practiced on
the corporation to be in this category of offense. This reasoning is criticized in 13
STAN. L. REv. 378, 380 (1961). Both Hooper and Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp.
21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), which also rejected the theory that corporations could not sue under
rule lOb-5, pointed out that overvalued stock would be distributed to the public as a result
of the deception and that it was within the intent of Congress to protect against this. Other
courts have permitted the corporation to sue without showing that the public will be in-
jured. Dembitzer v. First Republic Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91445 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Dauphin Corp. v.
Davis, 201 F. Supp. 479 (D. Del. 1962). Thus, injury to the public interest may be a sufficient,
though not a necessary, ground for recovery.
79 The corporation's suit will be brought by shareholders since the directors cannot be
expected to initiate an action against themselves. Since the corporation is a purchaser,
there is some question as to the effect of § 12(2) of the Securities Act upon the action
brought under rule lOb-5. Section 12(2) applies to all sellers who make a false representation
by means of "prospectus or oral communication," which will normally be the case if the
insider defrauds the other directors by misrepresenting a material fact. Some courts have
perceived a conflict in the fact that the applicability of the two sections overlaps and have
distinguished the application of the sections by requiring scienter under lOb-5. If the insider
should omit to state a material fact, § 12(2) would not apply and no conflict with rule lOb-5
would arise. Most courts have apparently ignored the conflict between the two sections or
have allowed the buyer to sue under rule lOb-5. E.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir.
1961); Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948). A few courts,
however, have insisted that the buyer suing under rule lOb-5 allege fraud and the scienter
which that action requires, in an attempt to differentiate the two remedies. Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 91539 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1965); Trussel v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp.
757 (D. Colo. 1964). Where the plaintiff is able to prove willful deception on the part of
the insider, the difference in proof required by the two remedies will not be important. In
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It might be argued that if rule lOb-5 were applied to permit a cor-
poration to recover for a fraudulent tender by its directors, there would
be no limit to the internal affairs subject to scrutiny under rule lOb-5.80
But the director's deception of the corporation by overvaluing his
tendered stock is like the normal application of rule lob-5 to an in-
sider's nondisclosure affecting a security's value. A shareholder in this
situation sues on behalf of the corporation injured by nondisclosure
in purchasing its stock, and as such does more than merely enforce a
fiduciary duty which exists independently of the transaction. The cor-
poration's purchase of stock at an inflated price should be within the
protection of rule 1 Ob-5 8' since the corporation is deceived by an insider
in the same manner as is any other purchaser. Supporting this position
are cases holding that the issuance of stock by a corporation to an
insider for insufficient consideration will support a suit on the corpora-
tion's behalf under rule lob-5 even though the insider is guilty of a
breach of fiduciary duty and mismanagement.8 2 Both the purchase and
the sale by a corporation involve situations which Congress attempted
to remedy by the securities acts: deception involving the valuation of
securities which results in harm to investors.
cases where this proof is not available, there could be a difference depending upon the
degree of scienter required under rule lob-5. See Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a
Private Suit Under SEC Antifraud Rule 10b-5, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1070 (1965); Comment,
Negligent Misrepresentation Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 824 (1965); Comment,
supra note 76, 74 YALE L.J. 658.
80 Although the language of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 seems to include any fraud "in
connection with" a sale or purchase, the breadth of this statement has been limited by
the desire to avoid the investigation of internal corporate disputes without more specific
congressional authorization. See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment,
78 HARv. L. REv. 1146, 1166 (1965); Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 725, 831-35 (1956). But see McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Joseph, Civil Liability Under lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw.
U.L. REv. 171, 178 (1964).
Furthermore, courts have not allowed recovery under rule lOb-5 to plaintiffs not parties
to a transaction who merely seek to enforce a general fiduciary duty of the defendant.
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952); Chashin v. Mencher, CCH
FED. SEc. L. REp. 91551 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1965); Keers 9- Co. v. American Steel & Pump
Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa.
1963); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 74 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Pa. 1947). But see McManus
v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 5 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 810 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (motion to dismiss
denied where suit by minority shareholder against majority shareholders who sold their
stock to third parties at a premium).
81 See New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); 3 Loss
1770-71; Fleischer, supra note 80, at 1165.
82 Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec.
Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Kane v. Central Am.
Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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B. Transactions Involving Corporate Control
The tender offer may be instigated by the directors or other insiders
for the purpose of utilizing the corporation's funds to secure control. 83
The tender offer may be aimed at eliminating a particular block of
opposing stock or may be calculated to increase the insiders' share by
decreasing the number of shares outstanding. The tender offer price
would normally be set attractively high in order to induce the sale.
Two courts recently considered the effect of a corporate purchase to
secure control for the directors; both O'Neill v. Maytag84 and Hoover
v. Allen8 5 dismissed derivative suits alleging that the directors failed
to disclose that their purpose in authorizing the purchase was to
strengthen their control. These decisions can be explained in terms of
the courts' desire to limit the application of rule 1Ob-5 to requiring
the disclosure necessary to enable shareholders to be aware of and to
enforce their rights, and to relegate questions dealing more generally
with the propriety of insiders' actions to state corporation law.
The Second Circuit in Maytag dismissed a derivative suit alleging
that the directors had authorized the purchase of the company's stock
from another corporation at a price above the market rate in order to
eliminate the threat which this block of shares posed to their control.
The court stated that there was a failure to allege facts "amounting
to deception" and limited the scope of rule lOb-5 to cases where there
is more than a mere breach of fiduciary duty, adding that rule 1Ob-5
does not impose "duties beyond that of honest disclosure."86 If the
court's rather confusing opinion intended to assert that rule lOb-5
is not violated because the corporation is not deceived when all di-
rectors have knowledge of the real purpose for paying more than the
market rate, its reasoning appears fallacious. There is no indication
that this position has any support in other decisions, and in fact the
Second Circuit held only a few weeks before Maytag that although a
majority of the directors had knowledge of the fraud, the shareholder
might sue derivatively under rule 1Ob-5.8 7 Neither logic nor common
sense denies that a corporation can be defrauded even if all the
83 See Kessler, Share Repurchases Under Modern Corporation Laws, 28 FORDHAM L. REv.
637, 671-72 (1960). This objective might be attained more covertly, as by having a subsidiary
or affiliate corporation or a pension fund administered by the officers of the corporation
make the purchase.
84 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
85 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
86 339 F.2d at 767. The SEC as amicus curiae had urged that deception exists when
directors purchase for an illicit purpose which is not disclosed to the shareholders. Brief
for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 14.
87 Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1964).
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directors are aware of the fraud, indeed that the directors themselves
can defraud the corporation. s 8 If a majority of the directors or the
entire board is involved 9 in the illegal action, the corporation is de-
ceived in the sense that those who ultimately bear its losses and who are
in a position to seek redress of its injury are ignorant of the fraud.
It can be argued that an improper motive for the tender offer, such
as using it to solidify control, should not be sufficient to create rule
1Ob-5 liability absent deception regarding the value of the security
sold.90 But if there is deliberate pricing of a tender offer above the
market price, whether for personal profit or to secure control, the policy
of the securities acts would seem to demand that the corporation be
allowed to recover. As noted previously, deception is present in such
cases in the insider's omitting to disclose a material fact in connection
with the corporation's purchase of its securities from tendering share-
holders.
88 The directors' deception poses the conceptual problem of whether the corporation
can deceive itself if the directors are regarded as being the "corporation" when they act.
The court in Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964), disposed of this
puzzle without difficulty. The fact that a majority of the directors were involved in the
fraud was not permitted to circumvent the securities acts' policy of protecting investors.
Referring to cases of embezzlement or conflict of interest, the court held that directors
can indeed defraud the corporation. See also Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc.,
235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), and New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp.
261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), holding controlling directors liable to the corporation under rule
lOb-5 for breaches of fiduciary duty similar to that in Maytag. Neither court discussed the
conceptual difficulty involved when the controlling directors deceive the corporation.
Furthermore, it is well-settled agency doctrine that its agents' knowledge will not be
imputed to a corporation when they have a personal interest in concealing the knowledge.
In addition, courts have employed the term "fraud" under circumstances similar to those
in Maytag. Fraud in the concealment of facts has not been limited to those cases where some
of the directors were unaware of the fraud. See Israels, Corporate Purchase of Its Own
Shares-Are There New Overtones?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 620, 626-27 (1965).
89 A defendant need not have been a party -to the transaction to be liable under rule
lOb-5. The privity requirement has been avoided in some cases by using a conspiracy
theory. E.g., Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Other cases
have simply dispensed with the requirement altogether. E.g., Miller v. Bargain City, 229
F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91317
(N.D. Ill. 1964); Cochrane v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In
Freed, the court stated that relief will be granted if the plaintiff proves "that he has relied
upon misleading statements uttered by the defendant concerning the securities in question;
that he has purchased the securities from whatever source, relying upon these misleading
statements; and that through such purchase he has suffered damage." Id. at 94363. This
would appear to be a recognition of the tort implications of rule lob-5 in that the defen-
dant's ability to foresee the plaintiff's reliance on his misstatement or omission are key
elements of liability.
90 See Fleischer, supra note 80, at 1165; Ruder, supra note 68, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. at 196-
206; Note, Securities Regulation-Rule lOb-5-A Federal Corporations Law?, 43 N.C.L.
REv. 637, 644-47 (1965).
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Hoover v. Allen9 presented a slightly different issue that helps to
delineate the scope of rule lOb-5. The plaintiff, who had not tendered
his stock, brought a derivative suit alleging that the purpose of the
offer was to ensure the insiders' control and that the insiders' omission
to disclose material facts made it possible for them to set the tender
price too low. The court distinguished purchases by a corporation
at an excessive price and held that there was no derivative cause of
action because the corporation could not be injured if it paid less than
what the shares were worth. The court thus suggested that an insider's
failure to disclose material facts which led to an overly high tender
offer price would be grounds for a suit under rule lOb-5 on behalf of
the corporation. Absent this misrepresentation, however, the mere fail-
ure to disclose that the directors' motive in authorizing the purchase
was to secure control would not violate rule 1 Ob-5.9 2 The court felt that
under these circumstances only the shareholders who had sold at the
deceptively low price could obtain relief.
A more interesting question is whether relief can be obtained when
the purpose of the purchase is to ensure control and the shareholders
receive a fair price. In such a situation both the corporation and the
tendering shareholders would have been deceived as to the motivation
for authorizing the tender offer, but neither would have been injured
financially. It would seem that the only possible infirmity in such a
transaction is that the corporation is not authorized to purchase shares
for such a purpose; this, however, is an issue outside the proper scope
of rule 1Ob-5 and should be decided solely as a matter of state corpora-
tion law. Absent a misrepresentation of the value of securities, the
purchase for control should not be considered fraud "in connection
with" the purchase of securities.9 3 There would appear to be no reason
for complaint by the selling shareholder in any case, since it must be
evident to one selling that whatever the insiders' motivation, as a matter
of fact the nontendering shareholders will own a greater percentage
of a corporation with fewer liquid assets than they did before the
91 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
02 Id. at 227-29.
93 There is some indication that any breach of a fiduciary duty in any way connected
with a security transaction may be challenged under rule lOb-5. See McClure v. Borne
Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961) (dictum); McManus v.
Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 5 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 810 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Joseph, supra note 80, at
178. With the possible exception of these authorities, it appears that both the judiciary and
the commentators are attempting to limit the scope of rule lOb-5 to situations having a
dose connection with securities transactions. Compare Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1964), with O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964). See Fleischer, supra
note 80, at 1165-66; Ruder, supra note 68, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. at 186-87; 51 VA. L. REv. 508
(1965).
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tender. No grounds for recovery based on rule 1Ob-5 exist because the
fact which was not disclosed was not material to a decision whether or
not to sell.
C. The Purchase of Securities Having Dividends in Arrears
The distinction between internal mismanagement and fraud in con-
nection with securities transactions is also reflected in the use of an offer
to purchase preferred stock which has unpaid accumulated dividends.
The passing of dividends will drive down the market price of the
stock, resulting in a tender price lower than it would have been if
the dividends had been paid.94 Tendering his shares also means that
the shareholder loses the possibility of collecting his arrears. Such a
tender offer frees for distribution to the remaining shareholders cash
which might have been used to pay dividend arrears. Since rarely will
the type of stock normally accruing dividends be held by the control-
ling shareholders, they may be greatly tempted to utilize the repur-
chase technique.
The applicability of rule lOb-5 to this situation is illustrated by
Cochrane v. Channing Corp.,95 where the plaintiff alleged that he was
induced to sell his preferred stock by the passing of dividends which
lowered its market price. The court ruled that even absent an affirma-
tive misrepresentation by the controlling shareholder, the latter was
guilty of "employing a device to defraud" and "engaging in a course
of business which operates as a fraud upon the seller" of securities.9 6
The failure to disclose the true reason for passing the dividends con-
stituted nondisclosure of a material fact in connection with the pur-
chase of the securities.
If a shareholder can prove a conscious effort to affect the price by the
passing of dividends, a scheme to defraud and a misrepresentation of
a material fact should be found. The nontendering insiders who benefit
from this misrepresentation are like those who fail to disclose the true
value of the stock in order to increase their share in the corporation
by inducing others to tender their shares at too low a price. The proper
function of rule lOb-5 is to require that all facts material to the trans-
action be revealed so as to permit an informed judgment by both
parties. If the real purpose for passing the dividends is disclosed, the
94 See Note, Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Preferred Shares With Dividends in
Arrears, 14 U. CI. L. REv. 66, 67 (1946).
95 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
96 Id. at 243. The court in Cochrane allowed the plaintiff to recover even though he
did not sell to the defendants. The implications of this holding for the corporate tender
offer are important: any person who relies on the statements made in connection with
the offer and sells his stock on the market may have an action against the corporation.
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shareholder can judge for himself the relative benefits of tendering,
holding his stock in hopes of future dividends and price rises, or
pursuing his remedy in state courts to force the payment of dividends
if such an action is possible.
The SEC, however, seems to wish to go further than this. It has
stated, respecting its regulation of closed-end investment companies,
that a purchase of shares with arrearages will violate rule lOb-5 "even
though all material facts are disclosed" if "substantial earnings are avail-
able for [the purpose of paying off the arrears]."97 Such a position is
highly problematical, especially with respect to determining when
"substantial earnings are available" for this purpose. Indeed, it is not
at all clear what role the judiciary should play in supervising manage-
ment's control over capital.98 It would appear that absent proof of an
intent to drive down the price of the preferred stock before the tender
offer, the corporation's purchase of preferred stock with arrears should
be outside the scope of rule 1Ob-5 and the propriety of management's
decision to pass dividends should be left to state corporation law.°9
Rule lOb-5 would seem to be satisfied if all facts surrounding the trans-
action are disclosed to the shareholders; prohibiting purchases merely
because surplus is available to pay off arrears would be an unwarranted
extension of the rule.
IV. CONCLUSION
One solution to the problems created by the tender offer would be
SEC supervision of the information distributed to shareholders. A
97 Investment Company Act Release No. 3548, Oct. 3, 1962. The SEC has taken the
position that fraudulent conduct may occur even if there is full disclosure. See Cohen &
Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative
Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 691, 703 (1964); Frohling,
The Promoter and Rule 10b-5; Bases for Accountability, 48 CORNEL L.Q. 274, 306-07 (1963).
98 Courts applying state law are reluctant to force the payment of dividends by second-
guessing management. See Johnson v. Fuller, 121 F.2d 618, 620 (3d Cir. 1941); Geller v.
Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943). The possibility of state remedies for
the seller is suggested in Note, supra note 94, 14 U. CHi. L. REv. at 71.
99 If the tender offer were made to another class of shareholders, the shareholder with
accumulated dividends might attempt to challenge the transaction under rule lOb-5. The
requirement that the plaintiff be a party to the transaction would seem to bar such a suit.
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
The only case to apply a different rule is McManus v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 5 S.E.C.
Jud. Dec. 810 (E.D. Pa. 1948), although in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), a
shareholder was allowed to enforce the proxy rules even though he was not deceived by
the misleading statement. The Court stated that that plaintiff could enforce the rules by
a derivative or an individual suit. One commentator forecasts the eventual overruling of
Birnbaum. Ruder, supra note 68, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. at 205. Of course, even if the Birnbaum
requirement could be overcome, it is not clear what fraud or nondisclosure the plaintiff
could allege.
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congressional amendment of the Securities Exchange Act might require
that a registration statement be submitted and a prospectus be sent to
each shareholder. Detailed requirements for such statements might
eliminate many of the violations of rule 1Ob-5 and discourage viola-
tions of state law and self-dealing generally while establishing guide-
lines by which corporations could determine what constitutes a mate-
rial fact. 00 The SEC presently regulates in this manner the purchases
by investment companies of their own securities. 1 1
Such a registration statement might also be required by an SEC
regulation under the present section 10(b). It is difficult to justify
such a regulation, however, in terms of the congressional grant of au-
thority to the SEC in the securities acts. 102 Congress seems not to have
intended to authorize a "reverse prospectus" under section 10(b),
since the Securities Act of 1983 expressly delineated the requirements
for registration statements which accompany offers to sell and au-
thorized the SEC to draft supplementary rules. 0 3 The grant of specific
power to regulate corporate purchases under the Investment Company
Act0 4 and the Holding Company Act'0 5 would appear to negate any
congressional intent that the SEC exercise this power over other cor-
porations. The general grant of power in section 10(b), interpreted in
light of its purpose to prevent fraudulent transactions, suggests that
Congress intended only that the SEC define the fraudulent practices
prohibited by the section.10 6 In addition, although the Commission
100 Such guidelines would avoid the pressure on management to refrain from acting
altogether, which some commentators fear might result from expanding liability without
establishing clear standards of liability. See Kennedy & Wander, supra note 64, at 1067;
Note, SEC Action Against Fraudulent Purchasers of Securities, 59 HARV. L. REv. 769, 778
(1946).
101 54 Stat. 825 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-23(c) (1964); see 17 C.F.R. § 270.23c-l(a)(6) (1949).
102 Furthermore, the SEC's resources may already be so overburdened that the Com-
mission could not handle the job as a practical matter. Cf. J. 1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 432 (1964); Gary, Book Review, 75 HARv. L. R y. 857, 861 (1962), suggesting that
the private enforcement of the Securities Acts is justified by the Commission's inability to
enforce them.
103 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964). Section 5(c) of the Securities Act applies
these requirements to "offers to buy" as well as offers to sell since a registration statement
is required for both transactions. This could serve as a basis for SEC supervision of tender
offers but for the fact that the legislative history of the section indicates that offers to buy
were included "solely for the purpose of preventing dealers from making offers to buy from
underwriters ... before the filing of the registration statement." 1 Loss 212-13 (emphasis
in original). See S. REP. No. 1036, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954); H.R. RaP. No. 1542, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1954). Thus, the statute has no application to corporate offers to purchase.
104 See note 101 supra.
105 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1963); 17 C.F.R. § 250.23(c)-(e) (1949).
106 Under the terms of § 10(b) there would be no sanction for the failure to register the
tender offer if there was full disclosure. In contrast, § 5 of the Securities Act makes it
illegal not to register before the offer to sell. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1964).
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recently extended its jurisdiction under section 5 of the Securities Act
by regulation after extensive hearings and study,10 7 this extension was
clearly authorized under the broad congressional grant of jurisdiction
in section 5. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act contains no
such authorization. 08 Thus, it can be argued persuasively that the SEC
should not regulate all tender offers without express congressional
authorization.109
Many problems relating to corporate purchases are common to the
general area of insiders' transactions, and discussion of the scope and
requirements of rule lob-5 should consider the problem in this broader
perspective." 0 Judicial determinations of the burden of disclosure
under rule lOb-5 are necessarily ad hoc and to date have inadequately
defined "materiality" and the scope of rule lob-5 liability. On the
other hand, SEC regulation in cases where congressional intent does
not justify judicial interference does not seem proper. Until Con-
gress elaborates on the standards required for liability under rule
lOb-5, these standards must be supplied by courts for the guidance
of both shareholders and corporate officials.
Criteria have been suggested above for the judicial determination of
the burden of disclosure under rule lOb-5 and for the limitation
of the scope of rule lob-5 respecting claims of corporate mismanage-
ment not involving deception in the purchase or sale of securities. A
corporation purchasing shares should be required to disclose all facts
necessary to an informed judgment by shareholders whether to tender
their shares at the offer price, but the company should not be required
to meet unrealistic disclosure demands. In addition, nontendering
shareholders may be deceived by insiders who manipulate the tender
offer for purposes of personal gain and control. The policy of rule 1 Ob-5
requires the disclosure of those facts necessary for such shareholders to
107 Report of Special Study of Securities Market of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, Parts 1-5, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
108 On the other hand, the Commission requires proxy statements and regulates their
contents pursuant to a grant of power identical to that in § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act. Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
person ... in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to
solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy .... " See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3
(1937). The Commission might similarly require statements of material facts to be sub-
mitted for its examination before a tender offer.
109 Senator Williams of New Jersey has introduced a bill which would require com-
pliance with disclosure requirements promulgated by the SEC in the case of a tender offer
for equity securities where the offeror was the issuer of the security or one who would own
more than 5% of the security after the tender. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
110 See Kaplan, Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, 18 Bus. LAW. 868, 872-73
(1963); Ruder, supra note 68, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. at 206-07.
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evaluate the purchased securities intelligently so that they can assert
their rights effectively. However, suits should be dismissed when the
mismanagement is not closely related to a violation of disclosure re-
quirements in connection with a securities transaction, because the sole
purpose of rule lOb-5 is to force full disclosure.
